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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been found vulnerable to noises
like adversarial examples and corruption in practice. A num-
ber of adversarial defense methods have been developed,
which indeed improve the model robustness towards adver-
sarial examples in practice. However, only relying on train-
ing with the data mixed with noises, most of them still fail to
defend the generalized types of noises. Motivated by the fact
that hidden layers play a very important role in maintaining a
robust model, this paper comes up with a simple yet power-
ful training algorithm named Adversarial Noise Propagation
(ANP) that injects diversified noises into the hidden layers in
a layer-wise manner. We show that ANP can be efficiently im-
plemented by exploiting the nature of the popular backward-
forward training style for deep models. To comprehensively
understand the behaviors and contributions of hidden layers,
we further explore the insights from hidden representation in-
sensitivity and human vision perception alignment. Extensive
experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-
10-P and ImageNet demonstrate that ANP enables the strong
robustness for deep models against the generalized noises in-
cluding both adversarial and corrupted ones, and significantly
outperforms various adversarial defense methods.
Introduction
Recent advances in deep learning have achieved remarkable
successes in various challenging tasks, including computer
vision (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012), natural
language processing (Bahdanau, Cho, and Bengio 2014) and
speech (Hinton et al. 2012). In practice, deep learning has
been routinely applied on large-scale datasets, where data
collected from daily life inevitably contain lots of noises
including adversarial examples and corruption (Szegedy et
al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). Unfor-
tunately, such noises are unprevailing to human beings, but
misleading to deep neural networks, which pose potential
security threats for practical machine learning applications
in both digital and physical world (Papernot et al. 2016;
Liu et al. 2019).
In the past few years, how to train robust deep neural
networks against the noises has attracted great attentions.
∗Corresponding author
The most successful progress lies in developing different
adversarial defense strategies (Xie et al. 2018; Dhillon et
al. 2018) against adversarial examples. These methods often
supply adversaries with non-computable gradients to avoid
common gradient-based adversarial attacks. However, Atha-
lye, Carlini, and Wagner argued that most of them only
pose a false sense of safety. They circumvent the obfus-
cated gradients and achieve nearly 100% attacking success
rates. Whereas, adversarial training (Szegedy et al. 2013)
survives it by augmenting training data with adversarial ex-
amples. However, though adversarially trained deep models
(Alexey, Ian, and Samy 2017) are robust to some single-step
attacks, they are still vulnerable to iterative attacks. More
recently, Yan, Guo, and Zhang proposed to improve adver-
sarial robustness via integrating an adversarial perturbation-
based regularizer into the classification objective.
Beside the adversarial examples (Xie et al. 2018; Cisse et
al. 2017), corruption noises such as snow, blur, and other
novel combinations also frequently occur in real world,
which also bring critical challenges for building strong deep
learning models. Dodge and Karam found that deep learn-
ing models behave distinctly subhuman to input images with
Gaussian noises. Zheng et al. proposed stability training
to improve model robustness against noises only confined
to JPEG compression. More recently, Hendrycks and Diet-
terich first established a rigorous benchmark to evaluate im-
age classifier robustness to 75 different corruption noises.
Despite the progress, till now there are rare studies de-
voted to improving model robustness against corruption, and
most existing adversarial defense methods still remain vul-
nerable to the generalized noises, mainly due to the sim-
ple training paradigm by adding adversarial noises to the
input data. It is well-known that, in deep neural networks
the influence of invasive noises to the prediction can be
directly reacted in the sharp variations in the middle fea-
ture maps during the forward propagation (Liao et al. 2018;
Cisse et al. 2017). Prior studies (Cisse et al. 2017) have
proven the fact that hidden layers play a very important role
in maintaining a robust model. In (Cisse et al. 2017), adver-
sarially robust models can be promised through constraining
the Lipschitz constant between hidden layers, e.g., linear and
convolutional layers, to be smaller than 1. Ilyas et al. gener-
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ated robust features with the help of penultimate layer of a
classifier, which in turn help training a robust model. More
recently, Santurkar et al. also noticed the importance of ro-
bust feature representation and uses them to deal with many
computer vision tasks. This indicates that the noise resis-
tance of hidden layers also plays an important role in train-
ing a robust model. Based on the fact, we can directly draw
insight from robust hidden representations and build strong
deep models by obtaining robust hidden layers during train-
ing.
In this paper, we propose a simple but very powerful train-
ing algorithm named Adversarial Noise Propagation (ANP)
to enable the strong robustness for deep models against gen-
eralized noises including both adversarial examples and cor-
ruption. It injects adversarial noises into the hidden layers
of neural networks during training, instead of the input in
traditional adversarial defense methods. This can be effi-
ciently accomplished by a simple modification of standard
backward-forward propagation, without introducing signif-
icant computation overhead. Because the adversarial noises
from hidden representations are considered during training,
models trained by ANP are expected to be more robust
against more types of noises, including both adversarial ex-
amples and corruption. We also try to give insights of the
contributions and behaviors of hidden layers during training
from the views of hidden representation insensitivity and hu-
man vision perception alignment.
Extensive experiments under both blackbox and whitebox
settings on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet are conducted
to demonstrate that ANP achieves excellent results com-
pared to the common adversarial defense algorithms includ-
ing the NeurIPS 2017 adversarial defense winning meth-
ods against various adversarial attacks. Meanwhile, exper-
iments on CIFAR-10-C and CIFAR-10-P (Hendrycks and
Dietterich 2019) prove that ANP can enhance strong cor-
ruption robustness for deep models as well. More evaluation
further proves that ANP supplies models with strong robust-
ness against generalized noises.
Preliminaries
Terminology and Notation
Given a datasetD with feature vector x∈X and label y ∈Y ,
the deep supervised learning model tries to learn a mapping
or classification function F : X → Y . Specifically, in this
paper we consider the visual recognition problem.
Adversarial Example
Given a network Fθ and an input x, whose ground truth label
is y, an adversarial example xadv is an input such that
Fθ(x
adv) 6= y s.t. ‖x− xadv‖ < ,
where ‖ · ‖ is a distance metric to quantify the seman-
tic distance between the two inputs x and xadv is small
enough. Whereas, adversarial example makes the model pre-
dict wrong label, namely Fθ(xadv) 6= y.
Corruption
Image corruption is random variation of brightness or
color information in images, such as Gaussian noise, De-
focus blur, Brightness, etc., and is commonly witnessed.
Supposing, we have a set of corruption functions C in
which each c(x) performs a kind of corruption function.
Thus, average-case model performance on small, general,
classifier-agnostic corruption define model corruption ro-
bustness:
Ec∼C [P(x,y)∼D(F (c(x)) = y)].
To sum up, corruption robustness measures the classifier’s
average-case performance on corruption C, while adver-
sarial robustness measures the worst-case performance on
small, additive, classifier-tailored perturbations.
Proposed Approach
Now we introduce our proposed approach Adversarial Noise
Propagation (ANP).
Adversarial Formulation
In the deep neural networks, the sharp variations in the hid-
den layers will propagate to the later layers and lead to the
undesired predictions in practice. Therefore, enhancing the
noise insensitivity and guaranteeing the stable behavior in
hidden layers will help promise a robust model. In order to
obtain a robust model against small noises, we are motivated
to improve the ability of layer-wise noise resistance in the
deep learning models.
Intuitively, we attempt to add adversarial noises to each
hidden layer of a deep learning model by propagating back-
ward from the adversarial loss during training, instead of
only manipulating the input layer in traditional adversarial
defense methods. This strategy forces the model to minimize
the model loss for a specific task, with the opposite adver-
sarial noise in each hidden layer that expects to maximize
the loss. Subsequently, the learnt parameters in each layer
enable the model to keep consistent and stable predictions
for the clean instance and its noisy surrogates distributing in
the neighborhood, and thus in turn pose strong robustness
for deep models.
Formally, recall that a deep neural network y = F (x; θ)
as a composition of a number of nonlinear maps, each of
which corresponds to a layer:
zm+1 = f(zm; θ), m = 0, . . . ,M,
with z0 = x denotes the input, zM = y the output, and
zm the output of the m-th hidden layer. Here θ collects the
weights of the network.
In our framework, we introduce an adversarial noise rm
on the hidden state zm at each layer:
zm+1 = f(zm + rm, θ), m = 0, . . . ,M.
We use y˜ = F (x; θ, δ) to denote the final network output
with the injected noises r = {rm}Mm=0 at all the layers. We
then learn the network parameter θ by minimizing the fol-
lowing adversarial loss:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
r
(
L(y, F (x; θ, r))− η
2
||r||22
)]
,
(1)
where for each data point (x, y), we search for an adversarial
noise r, subject to an L2 norm constraint. The coefficient η
controls the magnitude of the adversarial noise.
Noise Propagation
The key challenge of this framework is obviously solving the
inner maximization for individual input data points. This is
efficiently addressed in our Adversarial Noise Propagation
(ANP) by performing gradient descent on r, with a natural
backward-forward style training that adds minimum com-
putational cost over the standard back propagation. This in-
duces the noises propagation across layers and noise injec-
tion into hidden layers during the backward-forward train-
ing.
Specifically, in each iteration, we first select a minibatch
of training data. For each data point (x, y) in the minibatch,
we approximate the inner optimization by running k steps
of gradient descent to utilize the most information in each
mini-batch, and fit the data distribution better. Initializing at
rm,0 = 0 for all m = 0, . . . ,M , we have the adversarial
gradient for the m-th hidden layer zm:
gm,t = ∇rmL(y, F (x; θ, rt)) = ∇zmL(y, F (x; θ, rt)),
where we draw the key observation that the gradient of the
adversarial noise rm equals the gradient of the hidden states
zm, which is already calculated in the standard backward
propagation, hence introducing no additional computations.
Specifically, the noise gradient is calculated recursively
during the standard backward propagation:
gm−1,t =
∂L(y, F (x; θ, r)
∂zm−1,t
=
∂L(y, F (x; θ, r)
∂zm,t
· ∂z
m,t
∂zm−1,t
= gm,t · ∂z
m,t
∂zm−1,t
.
Performing gradient descent on rm yields an update:
rm,t+1 ← (1− η)rm,t + ε
k
gm,t
||gm,t||2 , (2)
where ε is the stepsize and it is normalized by the number of
steps k, so that the overall magnitude of update for k steps
equals ε. The factor (1 − η) factor corresponds to the L2
regularization of the noise magnitude. Practically, η and ε
control the contribution of the previous noise value rm,t and
the gradient gm,t to the new noise rm,t+1, respectively.
Learning with a Noise Register In practice, ANP is im-
plemented efficiently in a backward-forward training pro-
cess. Namely, for each mini-batch training we store the cor-
responding adversarial noise r for each hidden layer during
backward propagation process; during forward propagation
process, we simply fetch r as the noise and add to the input
in the corresponding hidden layer after affine transforma-
tion and before activation function. This training procedure
introduces no substantial increase in computation and mem-
ory consumption, except that we need to integrate a regis-
ter S into each neuron for storing the adversarial noise r as
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Figure 1: Adversarial noise propagation with the noise reg-
ister during backward-forward training.
we illustrate in Figure 1. At the inference time, S can be
discarded, leading to no influence on the model complexity.
Algorithm 1 shows more details of the training process with
ANP in each mini-batch.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Noise Propagation (ANP)
Input: mini-batch data (x, y)
Output: robust model parameters θ
Hyper-parameter: η, ε and k
1: for t in k steps do
2: // Backward propagation
3: Update model parameters θ using standard back-
propagation.
4: Compute and propagate adversarial gradient:
gm,t−1 = gm+1,t−1 · ∂zm+1,t−1∂zm,t−1
5: Compute, propagate and save adversarial noise:
rm,t = (1− η)rm,t−1 + εk g
m,t−1
||gm,t−1||2
6: // Forward propagation
7: Compute the affine transformation:
zm,t = am−1,twm−1 + bm−1
8: Fetch and add adversarial noise:
zm,t+ = rm,t
9: Compute the activation:
am,t = relu(zm,t)
10: end for
Connections with the Related Works
ANP serves as a more general framework that observes ad-
versarial noises in more flexible ways.
Traditional adversarial training The idea of traditional
adversarial training stems from data augmentation. PGD-
based adversarial training (PAT) (Madry et al. 2017) and new
adversarial training (NAT) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2016) train deep models with training data mixing clean
examples as well as adversarial examples generated by PGD
(Madry et al. 2017) and FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014), according to the following objective func-
tion:
min
θ
ρ(θ), ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
r
L(y, F (x+ r; θ))
]
,
where r is a small ball that controls the magnitude of the
noise. It is easy to see that both PAT and NAT only consider
the adversarial noises in input data, which can be considered
as a special case of ANP when we only consider adversarial
noises in the 0-th hidden layer. Furthermore, the standard
PAT and NAT typically only perform one step of gradient
ascent on the adversarial noise, corresponding to the case of
k = 1 in our framework.
Ensemble adversarial training (EAT) To improve the di-
versity of adversarial examples, EAT (Trame`r et al. 2017)
employs a set of models F to generate different adversarial
examples for data augmentation. In ANP, various adversar-
ial noises (with different noise sizes ε, iteration steps k, and
noise magnitudes r) are generated in each layer during train-
ing, increasing the diversity and complexity of adversarial
noises injected into the model.
Layer-wise adversarial training (LAT) LAT (Sankara-
narayanan et al. 2018) is proposed as a mechanism of regu-
larization to prevent overfitting (and hence has the different
goal from ANP). During their training time, adversarial gra-
dients in current mini-batch are computed through the pre-
vious mini-batch. However, the adversarial noises in ANP
for one specific mini-batch are computed only in the same
mini-batch. We believe that the high correlation in one mini-
batch will lead to better performance. Therefore, we intro-
duce the progressive backward-forward propagation to fully
utilize the information contained in every mini-batch data.
Meanwhile, we take the contribution of previous noise dur-
ing progressive iteration into consideration leading to better
performance. Also, according to our study about the impor-
tance and effect of hidden layers in later section, only bot-
tom layers should be considered during training to get robust
model.
Experiments and Evaluation
In this section, we will evaluate our proposed ANP in the
popular image classification task. Following the guidelines
from (Carlini et al. 2019), we compare ANP with the state-
of-the-art adversarial defense methods against both adver-
sarial noises and corruption as well.
Experiments Settings
Datasets and Models For the adversarial robustness, we
adopt the widely used CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
CIFAR-10 consists of 60K natural scene color images with
10 classes of size 32 × 32 × 3 (Krizhevsky and Hinton
2009). We use VGG-16, ResNet-18, DenseNet and Incep-
tionV2 for CIFAR-10. ImageNet contains 14M images with
more than 20k classes (Deng et al. 2009). For simplicity,
we only choose 200 classes from 1000 in ILSVRC-2012
with 100K and 10k images for training set and test set, re-
spectively. The models we use for ImageNet are ResNet-18
and AlexNet. We apply a diverse set of adversarial attack
models including: FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014), BIM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), Step-
LL (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), MI-FGSM
(Dong et al. 2018), PGD (Madry et al. 2017), BPDA (Atha-
lye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) and C&W (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017). We also adopt MNIST, but show the experimen-
tal results in the supplementary materials due to the limited
space.
For the corruption robustness, we test our proposed
method on CIFAR-10-C and CIFAR-10-P (Hendrycks and
Dietterich 2019). CIFAR-10-C and CIFAR-10-P are the first
datasets for benchmarking model static and dynamic ro-
bustness against different common corruption and noise se-
quences under different severity levels (Hendrycks and Di-
etterich 2019). They are created from the test set of CIFAR-
10 with 75 different corruption techniques, e.g., Gaussian
noise, Possion noise, Pixelation, etc.
As for comparative defense models, we choose the state-
of-the-art defense methods including PAT (Madry et al.
2017), NAT (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), EAT
(Trame`r et al. 2017), LAT (Sankaranarayanan et al. 2018)
and Rand (Xie et al. 2018). Among these methods, EAT and
Rand achieved No.1 in round 1 and No.2 in NeurIPS 2017
adversarial defense competition.
In order to conduct fair experiments, we select the im-
plementation and common hyper-parameters for attack and
defense methods following their original papers and works,
e.g., (Alexey, Ian, and Samy 2017; Carlini et al. 2019;
Cisse et al. 2017; Madry et al. 2017), etc., which are compa-
rable to other defense strategies.
Evaluation Criteria
Adversarial robustness We use top-1 worst case classi-
fication accuracy in blackbox attack defense. For a specific
test set, corresponding adversarial example sets are gener-
ated using attack methods from different hold-out models.
Then, the final results are selected among them from the
worst one. However, top-1 classification accuracy is utilized
under whitebox attack. In this situation, adversaries know
every details of target model and generate adversarial exam-
ples for direct attack.
Corruption robustness We adopt mCE, Relative mCE
and mFR following (Hendrycks and Dietterich 2019).
Among them, mCE denotes the mean corruption error with
model compared to the baseline model, and Relative mCE
represents the gap between mCE and the clean data error.
Meanwhile, mFR stands for the classification differences be-
tween two adjacent frame in the noise sequence for a specific
image. The formal definitions of these metrics are listed in
the supplementary material.
Is It Necessary to Inject Noises to All Layers?
Theoretical research on the representation power of neural
network has been well studied (Hornik 1991; Delalleau and
Bengio 2011). However, studies for hidden layers are rarely
involved. Since every layer is not created equal (Zhang, Ben-
gio, and Singer 2019), an intuitive question for ANP training
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Figure 2: Subfigure(a) shows the results of VGG-16 trained
with adversarial noises added to different layer groups. The
solid lines denote models trained with different layer groups
via ANP and the dashed lines represent baseline method
NAT. Subfigure (b) denotes the layer weight re-assignment
experiment where dashed lines show baseline model with no
layer weight re-assignment, i.e., ANP.
emerged: do we need to add noises to all layers? In this sec-
tion, we try to investigate the contribution of hidden layers
when adversarial noises are injected and propagated.
We train a number of VGG-16 models on CIFAR-10
with adversarial noises injected into different layer groups
namely, the top-m layers. From the results in Figure 2 (a),
we can observe that the model robustness ascends (i.e., both
the classification accuracy for adversarial examples and the
negative mCE for corruption increase) when injecting noises
into the top-m (m ≤ 4) hidden layers. Surprisingly, it is not
true that the more layers injected with noises, more robust
the model is. This indicates that different hidden layers con-
tribute differently to model robustness in deep architecture.
Bottom layers are more critical to model robustness while
on the contrary the importance of upper layers is somewhat
scarce. Thus, it is sufficient to inject noises just into the bot-
tom layers for better model robustness, which will be used
to guide our experiments in the rest of the paper.
Meanwhile, we trained ANP with the progressive number
k=1, which is roughly similar to NAT with noises only con-
fined to top-1 layer, as we discussed before. Its performance
curves are shown by the orange and green solid lines with-
out marker (ANP-k1) in Figure 2, which are almost close to
that of NAT (1.5% difference due to implementation details),
while much lower than the model trained with k = 3 (ANP-
k3). This in turn proves the importance of our progressive
noise injection for the model robustness.
We further investigate hidden layer contribution to ro-
bustness individually via layer weight re-assignment. Given
a VGG-16 trained by ANP, we try to re-assign the layer
weights of the model with a corresponding vanilla model
at inference time. Analyzing each layer individually in the
context of specific network architectures allows us to get
more insights into the hidden layer behaviors. Intuitively,
greater model performance gap after weight re-assignment
means bigger weight differences, in turn indicating some-
what a more non-trivial hidden layer to model robustness.
As shown in Figure 2 (b), the influence of individual layer
weight re-assignment to model robustness reduces (classifi-
cation accuracy for adversarial examples and negative mCE
for corruption arises) as the layer goes closer to the predic-
tion. Thus, it double confirms that bottom layers are more
critical to model robustness while on the contrary the impor-
tance of upper layers is somewhat scarce.
We also conduct the experiment for randomly perturb-
ing each layer with gaussian noise N(0, 0.1), see below for
the brief results on CIFAR-10 with VGG-16, (clean, FGSM,
mCE): 88.5%, 51.3%, 118.5%, which is worse than ANP.
More experiments like ablation study and ANP on different
model depths can be found in the supplementary material.
Adversarial Robustness Evaluation
We first evaluate adversarial robustness for deep models
through blackbox and whitebox attack defense.
Blackbox attack defense For blackbox attack defense, we
train and compare each method with the same target model
architecture over specific datasets. Adversarial example sets
with 10k images are generated with various hold-out models
different from the target models.
CIFAR-10. As shown in Table 6, on CIFAR-10 we
employ VGG-16 as the target model and compare ANP
with various defense methods. The hold-out models in-
clude ResNet-50, DenseNet and Inception-v2. Among de-
fense methods, EAT is trained ensemble with VGG-16 and
Inception-v2, meanwhile Rand resizes input images from 32
to 36 and follows a NAT trained VGG-16.
ImageNet. AlexNet is applied as the target model, and
adversarial examples are generated from ResNet-18 and
AlexNet. Meanwhile, EAT is trained with AlexNet and
ResNet-18, and Rand resizes input images from 224 to 254
and follows a NAT trained AlexNet. The results on Ima-
geNet are shown in Table 10.
From the above blackbox experiments, we obtain the
following observations: (1) Under blackbox setting, in al-
most all cases ANP achieves the best defense performance
among all methods. (2) ANP enables strong robustness to the
widely-used deep models against both single-step and iter-
ative blackbox attacks. (3) Usually the classification perfor-
mance to clean examples degrades fiercely when introducing
more noise in the model, e.g., 5% to 10% accuracy decrease.
However, ANP supplies the models with good generaliza-
tion ability, keeping the stable and close classification accu-
racy to the Vanilla models on CIFAR-10 as well as MNIST.
Due to the limited space, more experimental results can be
found in the supplementary material.
Whitebox attack defense In whitebox scenario, we apply
PGD, C&W and the attacking framework BPDA for their
strong attack abilities. Moreover, BIM is utilized in BPDA to
demonstrate whitebox attack after circumventing the gradi-
ent mask with iterative number 5. The results on CIFAR-10
and ImageNet are listed in Table 8.
From these tables, we can conclude that under whitebox
setting ANP owns significant advantages on defending
against adversarial examples over other methods on these
datasets, though slightly weak performance of ANP on PGD
attack under ImageNet is witnessed compared to PAT. The
overall results indicate that ANP with diversified noises en-
ables model robustness against various attack methods and
Table 1: Blackbox attack defense results on CIFAR-10 with VGG-16.
VGG-16 CLEAN FGSM PGD STEP-LL MI-FGSM
ε = 8 ε = 16 ε = 8, α = 16 ε = 8, α = 2 ε = 8 ε = 8
VANILLA 92.1% 38.4% 19.3% 9.7% 0.0% 7.5% 2.3%
PAT 85.1% 82.3% 76.4% 84.2% 82.1% 80.1% 77.5%
NAT 86.1% 73.5% 70.2% 82.1% 80.3% 79.1% 72.6%
LAT 84.4% 75.8% 63.7% 83.2% 79.2% 78.3% 71.4%
RAND 85.2% 77.6% 70.8% 82.5% 80.2% 79.3% 73.2%
EAT 87.5% 81.2% 76.2% 85.1% 83.5% 82.7% 75.8%
ANP 91.7% 82.8% 76.4% 86.9% 84.4% 83.3% 80.1%
Table 2: Blackbox attack defense results on ImageNet with AlexNet.
ALEXNET CLEAN FGSM PGD STEP-LL MI-FGSM
ε = 8 ε = 16 ε = 8, α = 16 ε = 8, α = 2 ε = 8 ε = 8
VANILLA 61.7% 12.6% 9.2% 4.2% 4.3% 13.7% 3.5%
PAT 55.2% 41.5% 40.2% 41.9% 42.1% 41.5% 40.3%
NAT 53.3% 39.1% 34.2% 39.5% 39.6% 41.6% 34.7%
RAND 50.2% 39.2% 27.0% 40.1% 39.2% 40.9% 33.5%
EAT 55.0% 39.6% 35.2% 40.0% 39.9% 42.3% 36.8%
ANP 53.5% 41.7% 39.3% 42.0% 42.1% 42.7% 40.3%
enjoys strong capability of covering the varying decision
space in practice. However, we also witnessed that for big
dataset like ImageNet, clean accuracy drops for all methods.
The reasons might be two-folded. Firstly, adversarial robust
models need bigger capacity (Tsipras et al. 2018). However,
Alexnet, a relatively small model, may not have enough ca-
pacity to fit adversarial noises while keeping high accuracy
on clean examples. Secondly, trade-off between robustness
and accuracy does exist (Zhang et al. 2019) especially for
high-dimensional data. We will study it in the future.
Corruption Robustness Evaluation
For corruption robustness, we conduct the experiment with
10K images from CIFAR-10-C with 15 different corruption
and 5 severity levels. To test model dynamic robustness,
we use CIFAR-10-P which differs from CIFAR-10-C with
noise sequences generated for each image with more than
30 frames. As shown in the supplementary material, mCE
indicates the average corruption error and mFR is the aver-
age flip rate of noise sequence showing the model resistance
to noise sequence (both the lower the better). According to
the results in Figure 3 (a) and (b), ANP achieves the lowest
mCE and mFR value among all methods indicating strong
corruption robustness. More precisely, as shown in Table 4,
ANP surpasses comparative strategies with big margins, i.e.,
almost 6 and 30 for mCE and mFR, respectively. The results
mean that ANP can faithfully bring both static and dynamic
robustness against corruption.
Comparative methods, especially PAT, though perform
good on adversarial examples, show weak robustness to cor-
ruption. Also, an interesting phenomenon can be observed
that all comparative strategies even perform worse than
Table 3: Whitebox attack defense on CIFAR-10 and Ima-
geNet.
(a) CIFAR-10 with VGG-16
VGG-16 CLEAN BPDA PGD C&W
ε=8 ε=8 c=0.2
VANILLA 92.1% 0.2% 0.0% 8.2%
PAT 85.1% 40.5% 27.6% 41.4%
NAT 86.1% 24.5% 8.1% 31.6%
RAND 85.2% 0.2% 9.1% 34.2%
EAT 87.5% 37.6% 9.9% 35.2%
ANP 91.7% 43.5% 27.9% 48.1%
(b) ImageNet with AlexNet
ALEXNET CLEAN BPDA PGD
ε=8 ε=8
VANILLA 61.7% 7.9% 2.4%
PAT 55.2% 27.6% 28.7%
NAT 53.3% 26.8% 15.2%
RAND 50.2% 21.6% 16.7%
EAT 55.0% 25.0% 12.5%
ANP 53.5% 28.2% 27.4%
Vanilla model for dynamic corruption (showing in higher
mFR values). Most adversarial training methods attempt to
inject noises to inputs by searching for the worst-case per-
turbations which indeed improve adversarial model robust-
ness. However, their tactics seem to be worthless to average-
case perturbations, or even counteractive to corruption ro-
bustness. Since robustness requires high data complexity
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Figure 3: Model corruption robustness evaluation.
Table 4: Corruption robustness evaluation with mCE and
mFR.
VGG-16 ERROR MCE MFR
VANILLA 7.9 100.0 100.0
PAT 14.9 98.6 122.9
NAT 13.9 85.7 131.2
EAT 12.5 81.8 108.3
ANP 8.3 75.7 79.2
(Schmidt et al. 2018), our ANP introduces noises with high
complexity and diversity via progressive iteration contribut-
ing both adversarial and corruption robustness. Thus, we can
draw the conclusion that ANP builds robust model against
corruption compared to other defense methods.
What Did Hidden Layers Do during Noise
Propagation?
In this section, we try to uncover the behaviors and effects of
hidden layers during noise propagation from views of hidden
representation insensitivity and human vision alignment.
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Figure 4: Hidden representation insensitivity on relu of
conv3 layer and mean for all layers.
At a high-level perspective, robustness to noises can be
viewed as a global insensitivity property that a model satis-
fies (Tsipras et al. 2018). A model that achieves small loss
for noises in a dataset, will necessarily learn representations
that are insensitive to such noises. By injecting adversarial
noises to hidden layers, ANP can be viewed as a method to
embed certain insensitivity in each hidden representation for
models. Thus, we try to explain hidden layer behaviors from
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: Visualization of the loss gradient w.r.t. input pixels
on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) denotes the input image, (b) to
(d) represent gradients gained from Vanilla model, ANP on
top-all layers and ANP on top-4 layers, respectively.
the view of hidden representation insensitivity. We measure
the hidden representation insensitivity based on the change
degree of neuron activation value within pairs of sample (x,
x′) in which the distance between each pair is constrained
with ε. Intuitively, when fed with benign and polluted ex-
amples, more insensitively neurons behave, more robust the
models are. As shown in Figure 4, neurons in each layer be-
have more insensitively to ε-noises (PGD attack adversarial
examples and corruption) after trained with ANP.
Lastly, we explain model robustness from the view of
alignment with human vision perception that stronger model
gains more semantically meaningful gradient. As shown in
Figure 10, we observe that gradients for ANP trained net-
works on top-4 layers (d) align well with perceptual features
(such as edges) of input images. On the contrary, these gra-
dients have no coherent patterns and appear very noisy to
humans for Vanilla networks (b), and are less semantically
meaningful for ANP trained model on all layers (c).
Conclusion
In order to improve model robustness against noises, this
paper proposes a training strategy named Adversarial Noise
Propagation (ANP), which injects diversified noises into the
hidden layers in a layer-wise way. Also, ANP can be imple-
mented efficiently through standard backward-forward pro-
cess hence introducing no additional computations. Exten-
sive experiments on the visual classification task demon-
strate that ANP can enable the strong robustness for deep
networks, and thus help obtain very promising performance
against various types of noises. For future work, we are inter-
ested in devising a more adaptive algorithm which considers
the heterogeneous behaviors of different layers.
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Appendix
Adversarial Attack Algorithms
Finding an adversarial example is equivalent to solve the
non-convex optimization problem, which is hard to calculate
directly. Thus, many adversarial attack methods have been
proposed to solve the problem. Here, a brief introduction of
the most widely used ones is shown below:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy proposes FGSM as a simple way to
generate adversarial examples. This method is simple and
computationally efficient compared to more complex meth-
ods like L-BFGS:
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, ytrue)).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). A straightforward exten-
sion of FGSM is BIM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
2016) which applies it multiple times with small step size:
xadv0 = x,
xadvn+1 = Clipx,{xadvn + α · sign(∇xJ(xadvn , ytrue))}.
Single-Step Least-Likely Class Method (Step-LL).
This variant of FGSM introduced by Kurakin, Goodfel-
low, and Bengio targets the least-likely class, yLL =
argminf(x) :
xadv = x−  · sign(∇xJ(F (x), yLL)).
Momentum Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM). As an iter-
ative gradient-based attack method, MI-FGSM (Dong et
al. 2018) utilizes momentum to boost attack performance
achieving No.1 in NIPS 2017 adversarial attack competition:
gn+1 = µ · gn + ∇xJ(x
adv
n , ytrue)
||∇xJ(xadvn , ytrue)||1
,
xadvn+1 = x
adv
n + α · sign(gn+1).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). A more powerful
adversary is the iterative variant of FGSM, which is essen-
tially projected gradient descent on the negative loss func-
tion (Madry et al. 2017):
xadv0 = x,
xadvn+1 = Πx,S{xadvn + α · sign(∇xJ(xadvn , ytrue))}.
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA). Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner proposes an
adversarial attack framework which circumvents the
non-differentiable input filter by conducting iterative
gradient-based whitebox attack on x directly. BPDA suc-
cessfully breaks 7 of 9 adversarial defense strategies in
ICLR 2018.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W). Given x, C&W L2 attack
Carlini and Wagner searchs for w with a target class t that
solves:
min ||1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x||22 + c · f(
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)),
with F defined as:
F (x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t, k).
Definition of Model Corruption Robustness
Evaluation Criteria
In order to comprehensively evaluate a classifier’s robust-
ness to corruption, Hendrycks and Dietterich proposed three
different metrics to score the performance of a classifier.
mCE. The first evaluation step is to take a trained classi-
fier f, which has not been trained on CIFAR10-C, and com-
pute the clean dataset top-1 error rate as EFclean. The second
step is to test the classifier on each corruption type c at each
level of severity s denoted as EFs,c. They adjust for the vary-
ing difficulties by dividing by errors of a baseline model.
Finally, mCE is computed as follows:
CEFc =
∑5
s=1E
F
s,c∑5
s=1E
base
s,c
.
Thus, mCE is the average of 15 different Corruption Errors
(CE).
Relative mCE. A more nuanced corruption robustness
measure is Relative mCE. If a classifier withstands most cor-
ruption, the gap between mCE and the clean data error is
minuscule. So, Relative mCE is calculated as follows:
Relative mCEFc =
∑5
s=1E
F
s,c − EFclean∑5
s=1E
base
s,c − Ebaseclean
,
whereas Relative mCE is the average score of them.
mFR. Let us denote m noise sequences with S =
{(x(i)1 , x(i)2 , ..., x(i)n )}mi=1 where each sequence is made with
noise p. The ‘Flip Probability’ of network F : x →
{1, 2, 3, ..., 1000} on noise sequences S is:
FPFp =
1
m(n− 1)
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=2
1(F (x
(i)
j ) 6= F (x(i)j−1))
= Px∼S((F (xj) 6= F (xj−1)).
Then, the Flip Rate FRFp = FP
F
p /FP
base
p and mFR is the
average value of FR.
Overall Training Phases
In order to make the model robust against various types of
real-world noises, and simultaneously achieve a strong gen-
eralization ability on clean examples, we need to carefully
control the magnitude of the noise to balance overfitting and
underfitting. To achieve this, we propose to divide our train-
ing procedure into three phases, each fed with adversarial
noise with different magnitude:
Phase 1: Zero Adversarial Noise (Clean Examples). This
phase utilizes only clean examples in order to achieve a
good starting point of our deep neural networks. Without
any noises, we can quickly train a model to have a basic
classification ability, avoiding instability before we find a
reasonably good model.
Phase 2: Large Adversarial Step Size. In this phase, we
introduce adversarial noise by using a relatively large adver-
sarial step size ε to further train deep learning models. This
allows us to quickly improve noise resistance ability of the
models, and strongly push the decision boundary away from
the data points to increase robustness against adversarial ex-
amples. Meanwhile, using large step size allows us to run
smaller number k of gradient steps, and hence saves compu-
tation.
Phase 3: Small Adversarial Step Size. Large adversarial
step size increases the robustness, but may hurt the predic-
tion performance. In the final phase, we decrease the adver-
sarial step size so that the model is properly fine tuned to
achieve a better balance between robustness and prediction
accuracy.
More Experiment Results
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Figure 6: Top-m layer group
noise study with ResNet-18.
In this section, we
show the results of
models trained with
adversarial noises
added to different
layer groups using
ResNet-18. The solid
lines denote models
trained with different
layer groups via ANP
and the dashed lines
represent baseline
method NAT. From
the results in Figure 6, we can observe that the model
robustness ascends as both the classification accuracy for
adversarial examples and the negative mCE for corruption
increase when adversarial noises are injected into the
top-m (m ≤ 7) hidden layers. The experimental results
also confirm our above conclusion that Bottom layers are
more critical to model robustness while on the contrary the
importance of upper layers is somewhat scarce on different
deep architectures.
Adversarial Robustness Evaluation
CIFAR-10. The results of blackbox and whitebox attack de-
fense on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18 are listed in Table 5 and
6. As we can see, ANP outperforms other defensive strate-
gies on both blackbox and whitebox senarios.
MNIST. With LeNet as the target model, the experimental
results of blackbox and whitebox are listed in Table 7.
Table 5: Whitebox attack defense results on CIFAR-10 with
ResNet-18.
RESNET-18 CLEAN BPDA PGD C&W
ε=8 ε=8 c=0.2
VANILLA 93.1% 0.0% 2.7% 8.4%
PAT 85.6% 45.2% 28.9% 43.7%
NAT 89.1% 33.5% 10.1% 32.6%
RAND 86.4% 1.9% 9.4% 31.2%
EAT 86.9% 40.1% 14.5% 39.1%
ANP 92.1% 54.0% 29.0% 47.3%
Corruption Robustness Evaluation
Corruption robustness experiment results are presented in
Table 8, 9 and 10. As for mCE and mFR, ANP ourperforms
other methods greatly with the lowest values showing the
strong corruption robustness. However, the value of Relative
mCE for ANP is slightly higher than EAT, ranking the sec-
ond place. The reason is that the error rate of ANP for clean
examples is much lower than that of EAT and the larger sub-
trahend of numerator in the formula contributes to a smaller
result of EAT model. We also test a VGG-16 model trained
with Gaussian noiseN(0, 0.1) added to input, but the results
turn to be weak to corruption with a mCE value 117.2.
Model Robustness Evaluation with Proposed
Criteria
Standard methods (Alexey, Ian, and Samy 2017; Athalye,
Carlini, and Wagner 2018), usually evaluate model robust-
ness only depending on classification accuracy which re-
veals limited information regarding how and why robust-
ness is achieved. To further understand how ANP behaves in
improving the model robustness, we investigate the perfor-
mance of different methods via our proposed criteria Worst
Case Boundary Distance and ε - Empirical Noise Insensitiv-
ity based on decision boundary distance and Lipschitz con-
stant.
Table 6: Blackbox attack defense results on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18.
RESNET-18 CLEAN FGSM PGD STEP-LL MI-FGSM
ε = 8 ε = 16 ε = 8, α = 16 ε = 8, α = 2 ε = 8 ε = 8
VANILLA 93.1% 12.8% 10.2% 6.3% 6.0% 21.4% 1.0%
PAT 85.6% 81.5% 72.1% 85.5% 84.9% 81.2% 76.7%
NAT 89.1% 78.1% 68.8% 80.8% 83.6% 80.4% 73.2%
LAT 88.9% 72.8% 69.1% 69.3% 68.3% 72.3% 70.8%
RAND 86.4% 77.6% 68.0% 75.7% 72.4% 71.0% 69.0%
EAT 86.9% 80.8% 72.5% 83.7% 84.7% 82.8% 80.0%
ANP 92.1% 83.6% 73.5% 85.5% 86.5% 84.0% 80.1%
Table 7: Blackbox and whitebox attack defense results on MNIST with LeNet.
BLACKBOX WHITEBOX
LENET CLEAN FGSM BPDA PGD C&W
ε=0.1 ε=0.2 ε=0.3 ε=0.2 ε=0.2 c=0.2
VANILLA 99.6% 72.0% 28.0% 4.0% 61.7% 22.3% 27.1%
PAT 99.0% 96.8% 90.7% 78.0% 90.6% 59.1% 63.7%
NAT 98.4% 94.0% 88.0% 72.0% 85.9% 45.1% 51.4%
ANP 99.3% 97.1% 93.2% 78.0% 91.5% 59.1% 69.1%
Table 8: Corruption Error and mCE values of different corruption and strategies on CIFAR-10-C. The mCE value is the mean
Corruption Error of the corruption in Noise, Blur, Weather, and Digital columns. All models are not trained on CIFAR-10-C
images.
NOISE BLUR WEATHER DIGITAL
NETWORK ERROR MCE GAUSSIAN SHOT IMPULSE SPECKLE DEFOCUS GLASS MOTION ZOOM GAUSSIAN SPATTER SNOW FROST FOG BRIGHT CONTRAST ELASTIC PIXEL
VANILLA 7.9 100.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PAT 14.9 98.6 41 47 59 52 90 43 89 84 72 95 97 94 208 206 154 110 62
NAT 13.9 85.7 51 58 105 63 89 52 90 81 83 91 80 65 136 111 112 102 67
EAT 12.5 81.8 37 44 50 47 84 46 94 75 74 87 77 70 152 125 126 102 63
ANP 8.3 75.7 36 41 59 45 82 51 85 76 77 79 70 61 140 99 123 90 55
Table 9: Relative Corruption Errors and Relative mCE values of different corruption and strategies on CIFAR-10-C. All models
are not trained on CIFAR-10-C images.
NOISE BLUR WEATHER DIGITAL
NETWORK ERROR REL.MCE GAUSSIAN SHOT IMPULSE SPECKLE DEFOCUS GLASS MOTION ZOOM GAUSSIAN SPATTER SNOW FROST FOG BRIGHT CONTRAST ELASTIC PIXEL
VANILLA 7.9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PAT 14.9 68.1 11 15 33 18 65 43 75 54 60 65 55 51 183 162 140 81 20
NAT 13.9 69.8 35 38 102 44 69 36 76 61 67 69 57 39 157 99 111 89 33
EAT 12.5 57.6 14 15 28 17 49 24 75 44 47 49 44 40 175 122 126 76 18
ANP 8.3 63.6 20 21 47 25 66 38 77 61 64 58 50 41 175 98 131 80 22
Worst Case Boundary Distance The minimum distance
to the decision boundary among data points reflects the
model robustness to small noises (Cortes and Vapnik 1995;
Elsayed et al. 2018). Due to the computation difficulty for
decision boundary distance, we propose Worst Case Bound-
ary Distance (denoted as Wf ) in a heuristic way. A larger
Wf means a stronger model. Given a learnt model f and
point xi with class label yi (i = 1, . . . , N ), we first gen-
erate a set V of m random orthogonal directions (He, Li,
and Song 2018). Then, for each direction in V we estimate
the root mean square (RMS) distances φi(V ) to the deci-
sion boundary of f , until the model’s prediction changes,
i.e., f(xi) 6= yi. Among φi(V ), di denotes the minimum
distance (i.e., the worst case) moved to change the prediction
for instance xi. Then our Worst Case Boundary Distance is
defined as follows:
Wf =
1
N
N∑
i=1
di, di = minφi(V ). (3)
We choose 1,000 randomly selected orthogonal direc-
Table 10: Flip Rates and the mFR values of different perturbations and strategies on CIFAR-10-P. All models are not trained on
CIFAR-10-P images.
NOISE BLUR WEATHER DIGITAL
NETWORK ERROR MFR GAUSSIAN SHOT SPECKLE MOTION ZOOM GAUSSIAN BRIGHT SPATTER SNOW TRANSLATE ROTATE TILT
VANILLA 7.9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
PAT 14.9 122.9 106 100 99 103 185 173 137 119 116 110 104 129
NAT 13.9 131.2 119 114 114 107 249 219 140 117 97 110 97 137
EAT 12.5 108.3 107 104 105 99 119 120 123 118 99 107 91 108
ANP 8.3 79.2 82 84 85 86 73 76 86 87 76 79 70 76
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Figure 7: Worst Case Boundary Distance are computed
among five different VGG-16 models to change the pre-
dicted label: (a) the average distance moved in each orthogo-
nal direction, and (b) the minimum distance (i.e., Worst Case
Boundary Distance) moved for 100 different images.
tions, and compute the minimum distance along each di-
rection for a specific image to change the predicted label.
As shown in Figure 7 (a), models trained by ANP own the
largest distance. Meanwhile, Figure 7 (b) gives the mini-
mum distances moved for each of 100 randomly picked im-
ages to change their labels. It is easy to see that the distance
curve of ANP maintains almost the highest, with a big lead-
ing gap at the beginning. Table 11 further reports Wf for
different methods. The results consistently prove that ANP
enables the learnt deep models to have the strong discrim-
inating power with the large margins, thus obtain the most
robust model.
Table 11: Worst Case Boundary Distance among five VGG-
16 models trained with different training methods.
METHOD VANILLA PAT NAT EAT ANP
Wf 29.46 41.05 34.22 35.21 47.36
ε-Empirical Noise Insensitivity Xu and Mannor first in-
troduced the concept of learning algorithms robustness from
the idea that if two samples are “similar” then their test er-
rors are very close. Inspired by that, we propose ε-Empirical
Noise Insensitivity to measure model robustness against gen-
eralized noise from the view of Lipschitz constant, and a
lower value indicates a stronger model. We first select N
clean examples randomly, then M examples are generated
from each clean example via various methods, e.g., adver-
sarial attack, Gaussian noise, blur, etc. The differences be-
tween model loss function are computed when clean exam-
ple and corresponding polluted examples are fed to. The dif-
ferent severities in loss function is used to measure model
insensitivity and stability to generalized small noises within
constraint ε:
If (ε) =
1
N ×M
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
|lf (xi|yi)− lf (µij |yi)|
|xi − µij |∞
s.t. |xi − µij |∞ ≤ ε,
(4)
where xi, µij and yi denote the clean example, correspond-
ing polluted example and the class label, respectively. More-
over, lf (·|·) represents the loss function of model f .
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Figure 8: ε-Empirical Noise Insensitivity is calculated under
adversarial examples and corruptions as shown in (a) and
(b).
In this section, different methods including FGSM, PGD,
Gaussian noise, etc. are employed to generate adversarial
and corrupted examples from 100 clean images. For each
clean image, 10 corresponding polluted examples are gener-
ated with every method within noise constraint ε. As shown
in Figure 8 (a) and (b), ANP obtains the smallest noise insen-
sitivity in most cases, showing the great robustness to both
adversarial examples and corruptions.
Finally, more experiment results on CIFAR-10 with
VGG-16 trained on ANP are shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 (a)
and (b) illustrates the results on adversarial examples gen-
erated using FGSM and Step-LL with different parameters,
meanwhile subfigure (c) and (d) shows the results on Gaus-
sian noise and Shot noise.
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Figure 9: ε- Empirical Noise Insensitivity experiment results
with adversarial examples and corrupted images generated
on CIFAR-10.
More Semantically Meaningful Gradient.
In this section, we give more experimental results of gradient
visualization as shown in Figure 10. No preprocessing was
applied to the gradients (other than scaling and clipping for
visualization).
How Progressive Propagation Affects Model
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Figure 11: The effect of the
progressive propagation.
ANP adopts the pro-
gressive propagation to
pursue the optimized
noises in each layer.
Here we investigate the
impact of the progres-
sive process in ANP.
We train 4 VGG-16
models with different
iteration number k
of progressive steps.
Blackbox (FGSM with
different ε) are con-
ducted on CIFAR-10,
and the results of the defense performance is respectively
shown in Figure 11. From the figure, it is obvious that pro-
gressive procedure can improve model robustness against
adversarial examples. Also, we can get insights from the
view of data complexity as pointed in (Schmidt et al. 2018)
that training adversarially robust model needs significantly
larger sample complexity than standard model. Thus, it is
understandable that the progressive propagation as well as
the overall training phase improve the sample complexity
which in turn promote model robustness potentially.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 10: Visualization of the loss gradient with respect to
input pixels on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) denotes the input
image and (b) (c) and (d) represent gradients gained from
Vanilla model, ANP on top-all layers and ANP on top-4 lay-
ers, respectively.
Does Layer Depth Influence Model Robustness?
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Figure 12: Deep v.s. Shal-
low.
In this section, we bring
experiments for models
trained by ANP with
different depths, i.e.,
numbers of layers. We
use ANP to train VGG-
11, VGG-13, VGG-16
and VGG-19 with fixed
hyper-parameters and
test their performance
on clean examples,
adversarial examples
and corruption, respectively. Experimental results in Figure
12 show that the classification accuracy on clean and
adversarial examples as well as negative mCE on corruption
for 4 different models are nearly the same which indicates
that models trained with ANP shows barely superiority
between shallow and deep architectures against generalized
noises.
Hidden Representation Insensitivity.
As shown in Figure 13 (a) to (h), neurons in each layer be-
have more insensitively to ε-noises (PGD attack adversarial
examples and corruption) after trained with ANP.
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Figure 13: Hidden representation insensitivity for VGG-16
on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) to (h) represent the hidden
representation insensitivity in layer conv2 relu, conv4 relu,
conv6 relu, conv8 relu, conv10 relu, conv11 relu,
conv12 relu and conv13 relu, respectively.
Implementation Details
In this section, the implementation details of ANP and other
defensive methods are given.
ANP. We train models with different hyper-parameters
on different datasets. On MNIST, the model is trained with
noises (η =0.4, ε=0.6 and k=8). As for CIFAR-10, we first
train model with clean examples for 40 epochs, then we
use big noises (η =1.0, ε=1.0 and k=3) and small noises
(η =0.3, ε=0.3 and k=5) of 50 epochs, respectively. On
ImageNet, the model is trained with clean examples for 20
epochs, big noises (η =1.0, ε=10 and k=5) for 30 epochs
and 2 steps of small noises with signum function as (η =1.0,
ε=0.2 and k=5) and (η =0.2, ε=0.2 and k=5) for 40 epochs.
During training, Gaussian noises are added to each hidden
layer of the model to promote performance.
PAT. The adversarial examples used for PAT are gener-
ated with PGD with ε=8, k =10 and α =2 on current target
model. The clean and adversarial examples in the training
set are mixed in the ratio of 1 to 1.
NAT. The adversarial examples used for NAT are gener-
ated with Step-LL on current target model with  obeyed
normal distribution N(0, 8) and truncated to [0, 16]. More-
over, the ratio of clean and adversarial examples in the train-
ing set are 1 to 1.
EAT. Experiment settings for EAT are the same for
NAT except for the target models for adversarial example
generation. On CIFAR-10, the target models are VGG-16,
Inception-v2 and the current training model. Meanwhile, the
target models on ImageNet are AlexNet, ResNet-18 and the
current training model.
LAT. The noises needed at each hidden layer in current
mini-batch are generated from the previous mini-batch with
noise ε. As the missing of detailed experiments information
in the original paper, we set ε =0.1 in each hidden layer.
Rand. On CIFAR-10, it randomly resizes input images
from 32 to 36 and follows a vanilla model. However, Rand
randomly resizes input images from 224 to 254 and follows
an EAT trained model on ImageNet.
